Prosecution:

The Village of Kenmore charged Stephen Kenney, resident of 186 Victoria Boulevard, with violating the Municipal Code. Kenney allowed the grass on his front lawn to grow beyond the height allowable by code, which states, “Premises shall conform to the desirable residential character of the property.” The code requires property owners to bear responsibility for “the prevention of undergrowth and accumulation of plant growth that are noxious or detrimental to health.” The prosecution asserted that the ordinance was enacted to protect citizens and to proscribe conduct that “offends public sensibilities.” Kenney’s lawn became a community concern when residents of the neighbourhood began to complain that the lawn was “noxious to look at” and “depressing.”

Kenney was convicted of violating the Municipal Code.

Defence:

Kenney appealed his conviction on three grounds. First, he argued that the code was unconstitutionally vague. It demanded that homeowners “conform to the desirable residential character of the property,” without defining the meaning of “desirable.” The village explained that the alleged vagueness simply reflected the fact that community norms were perpetually in a state of flux, thus requiring a flexible standard. Second, Kenney challenged the authority of the local government to regulate community aesthetics at all, claiming that it was entitled only to police matters of public health and safety. In response, the village asserted that a governmental body had the right to protect the visual sensibilities of its citizens. Third, Kenney, with the aid of the Civil Liberties Union, argued that the lawn’s appearance was an exercise of his freedom of speech and subject to First Amendment protection. According to Kenney, his lawn was a communicative surface, “a symbol of logical reasoning and a site for scholastic exercise.” Kenney sought to have his conviction reversed.

Ruling:

The court stated, “Just because Kenney intended to express an idea, it did not constitute ‘speech’ subject to First Amendment protection. Further, there was virtually no likelihood that Kenney’s message would be understood by those who viewed his lawn.” The court refuted the “communicative” capacity of Kenney’s lawn asserting, “The lawn says nothing, it represents nothing, and it symbolizes nothing.” The original judgment against the defendant was affirmed.

Plaintiff:

Quentin Anthony, resident of 105 Bay View Drive, claimed that Donald Searle attempted to seize land that Anthony believed to be his own. One morning Anthony discovered construction equipment entering his property and trampling his well-maintained lawn. The equipment, he learned, was contracted by his neighbour Searle for the construction of a garage on a parcel of land straddling the two neighbors’ yards. Never having performed a formal lot survey when he took possession of his premises, Anthony assumed the northern boundary of his property to be the “lawn texture transition line,” a line demarcating a change in appearance between the well-maintained lawn on his land and the rough, overgrown vegetation on his neighbour’s. Believing that he had properly understood the limits of his property from the time he took title fifteen years before, Anthony had nurtured and groomed the lawn as his own; he had regularly tilled and prepared the soil, planted new sod, reseeded and fertilized the grass, mowed the lawn weekly, and watered it daily. At no time did Searle challenge Anthony’s occupation of the now-disputed land. Anthony sought an injunction to restrain his neighbour from erecting the garage and asked to be declared the owner of the parcel by adverse possession.

Defendant:

Searle disputed the plaintiff’s claim to the property. To avoid any ambiguity before the start of construction, Searle had engaged a professional land surveyor to verify the precise limits of his land. After ascertaining that the parcel belonged to him, Searle contracted a backhoe and bulldozer and began excavation for the foundation of his future garage. On the first day of construction, his efforts were interrupted by the plaintiff. Searle did not dispute the fact that his neighbour maintained the lawn on that strip of land; he complained, however, that the plaintiff took this action entirely on his own accord without seeking permission from him. Thus, Anthony’s fifteen years of lawn maintenance amounted to fifteen years of illegal trespass onto his property. Searle maintained that the plaintiff’s false perception of his lot lines did not excuse his trespass and certainly did not entitle him to the land. Searle argued further that lawn maintenance was not among the physical improvements falling within the law of adverse possession, which includes the erection of fences and houses.

Ruling:

The Court agreed that the long-term cultivation of land was a convincing argument for a claim of adverse possession. Anthony acted as the true owner of the land up to the “lawn texture transition line” and was thus awarded title to the parcel.

Prosecution:

The City of Euclid charged local residents Mabel, Cicek, Choromanski, Zupanic, Tarantino, Jordan, and Fratcher with violations of the local lawn sign ordinance. The defendants all prominently displayed signs on their front lawns that endorsed the election of a political candidate. The ordinance distinctly prohibited political signs on residential lawns. It did, however, permit a maximum of two political messages per property, if located in residential windows. The purpose of restricting political lawn signs was not only to preserve the “aesthetics” of the community, but also to prevent public nuisance and local crime. In support of the latter argument, the prosecution cited several examples of expressions of political opinion that have resulted in damage to persons and property, including instances when motorists have driven across sidewalks and front lawns to strike down political graphics.

The defendants were convicted of violating Euclid’s lawn sign ordinance.

Defence:

The seven homeowners appealed their conviction, challenging the ordinance as a violation of their First Amendment right to free expression. By permitting real-estate lawn signs and other commercial lawn signs on private property but prohibiting lawn signs that carry political messages, the city had impermissibly decided which viewpoints may and may not be conveyed through this particular medium of communication. The city responded that the ordinance was “content neutral” and that it did not discriminate against any one particular political point of view in favour of another. It did not restrict political expression; it merely regulated its location to residential windows. The homeowners countered that the window-only requirement confined messages to interior domestic space, while the lawn sign functioned as a unique form of public address, being both a landscape element and a form of broadcast media. The defendants sought permission to maintain the signs on their lawns.

Ruling:

The Court ruled that the aesthetic welfare of the community could not override individual homeowner’s rights to free political expression on their own property. The original judgement against the defendants was reversed and the ordinance declared invalid.

Prosecution:

The City of Normal charged defendant Rainey Becher, resident of 1615 Ensign Drive, with the violation of the Municipal Weed Ordinance. The ordinance prohibited the growth of weeds or other noxious plants in excess of eight inches in height. This included “all weeds growing upon private property including those which may bear seeds of a downy or wingy nature, which when dry may become a fire menace, or which are otherwise noxious or dangerous.” Becher’s front yard, overgrown with Queen Anne’s lace, a long spindly weed that sprouts white filigree-like flowers and grows over three feet tall, stood in sharp contrast with the closely cropped, highly manicured lawns characteristic of her neighbourhood. The United States Department of Agriculture defined Queen Anne’s lace as “a pernicious weed and a wild carrot that is an ancestor of the modern vegetable.” According to the prosecution, “You can find the same stuff in any ditch in the country.” The city ordered Rainey to cut and remove the uncultivated vegetation from her property.

Defence:

Rainey Becher challenged the city’s authority to regulate landscape aesthetics and force individual property owners to conform to an arbitrary convention that restricted the meaning of “lawn” to a homogeneous green carpet. Becher defended her property as “a cultivated haven for some three dozen varieties of wildflowers,” including Queen Anne’s lace. Moreover, Becher argued that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague in that it did not provide an objective standard for determining what is meant by the term “weed.” Challenging the city’s assertion that “a weed is a plant that grows wildly on cultivated ground,” a horticulture expert for the defence testified that a weed is defined in agronomy as “any plant that is out of place.” “The meaning of the word ‘weed,’” he argued, “would essentially turn on the subjective intent of the person cultivating the property. As Mrs. Becher wilfully cultivated Queen Anne’s lace on her property, the plant cannot be considered a weed.”

Ruling:

The Court ruled for the defendant, stating that the City of Normal may regulate the growth of weeds only if it more precisely defines the term “weed.”